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1 Introduction 
The consequences of climate change for agriculture and food security in developing 
countries are of serious concern, not least because food supplies are already inadequate 
and poverty severe in many low-income countries, particularly in Africa. Moreover, 
many low-income countries are considered to be most vulnerable to climate change, 
mainly due to their reliance on rain-fed agriculture. Previous studies linking climate 
change to food security have typically used agricultural crop models (see, for example, 
Parry et al. 2004). Their predictions range from precipitous declines in yields for major 
African food crops (Schlenker and Lobell 2010) to more modest reductions (Lobell et 
al. 2008; Nelson et al. 2010), and even to improvements (Butt et al. 2005).  
Previous studies have, however, suffered from at least one of four limitations. First, they 
often provide global or regional assessments. Yet, climate change is expected to vary 
widely within continents and even countries, and so adaptation policies require higher-
resolution information, possibly even at sub-national levels (Lobell et al. 2008). Second, 
despite considerable uncertainty surrounding future climate change, some studies rely 
on only a few climate projections (see, for example, Butt et al. 2005). Third, many 
calibrated agronomic crop models exclude ‘autonomous adaptation’ that may offset at 
least some climate change damages. Finally, previous studies typically measure direct 
or partial equilibrium production changes, but may exclude indirect and general 
equilibrium effects, including price and household income changes and inter-sectoral 
linkages. Since food security depends on both food availability and accessibility, it is 
inadequate to measure production changes without considering, for example, the 
impacts of climate change for households’ incomes (Parry et al. 2004; Ahmed et al. 
2009).  
In this paper, we estimate the impact of climate change on agricultural production in 
Tanzania using detailed sub-national crop models. Four projections are drawn from 
available general circulation models (GCM) to reflect a range of possible temperature 
and precipitation changes by mid-century. These climate projections are then used in 
calibrated crop models to predict crop yield changes, which are in turn imposed on a 
highly-disaggregated, dynamic economy-wide model of Tanzania. This model captures 
indirect effects and permits (some) autonomous adaptation. The economic model allows 
us to evaluate the availability (production) and accessibility (income) dimensions of 
food security. In the next section, we describe the selected climate scenarios and the 
crop modelling framework used to translate climate conditions into crop yields. We then 
describe the economy-wide model and present the results from our simulated baseline 
and climate change scenarios. We conclude by summarizing our results and identifying 
areas for further research. 
2  Climate change and agricultural crop yields 
2.1  Selecting climate change scenarios 
General circulation models (GCM) produce a wide range of future climate change 
scenarios, especially when examined at the country-level (see Solomon et al. 2007). 
Apart from differences in the science of modelling global climate systems, there is also 
uncertainty in other key variables such as how the global economy will evolve in   6
coming decades. To account for this, GCMs typically employ different ‘emission 
scenarios’ based on assumptions about future populations, technological advances, and 
global agreements to reduce carbon emissions.  
To capture a range of possible climate change realizations, we select four projections 
with different temperature and precipitation outcomes averaged over all land areas of 
the country. The scenarios employed are presented in Table 1. In addition, to 
temperature and precipitation deviations, the table presents the climate moisture index 
(CMI) (Willmott and Feddema 1992), which is an indicator of a region’s aridity, at the 
national level. The CMI depends on average annual precipitation (P) and potential 
evapotranspiration (PET). A climate is classified as semi-arid (semi-humid) and then 
arid (humid) as PET increases (decreases) relative to precipitation. The CMI is defined 
as: 
      CMI = -1 + P/PET   when PET > P  
      CMI = 0      when PET = P 
      CMI = 1-(PET/P)  when PET < P 
A CMI of -1 is very arid and a CMI of +1 is very humid. The CMI is dimensionless 
since it is a ratio of two depth measurements.  
The scenarios are labelled WET, DRY, COOL, and HOT. The COOL scenario is 
relative to the other scenarios, and projects a mean average temperature increase of 1.1 
degrees Celsius by 2041–50 compared to 1.9 degrees Celsius in the HOT scenario. 
Three of the four scenarios project an increase in precipitation reflecting an analysis of 
climate futures for Tanzania conducted by the Tyndall Center (2010). While 
precipitation rises in three scenarios, the climate moisture index remains fairly constant 
in two of the three because rising temperatures increase PET. It is of some interest to 
note that the WET scenario for Tanzania is the same scenario identified by the World 
Bank as the driest scenario globally out of all 56 possible scenarios considered for 
analysis (World Bank 2010). This is a reminder that local conditions can differ 
drastically from broader averages. Overall, the GCMs suggest that Tanzania’s climate 
will become warmer and precipitation more uncertain as a result of climate change.  
To develop a baseline ‘no climate change’ scenario, we use historical daily climate data 
for 1997–2006 (i.e. mean, minimum, and maximum surface temperatures and 
precipitation) retrieved from the NASA POWER database (Stackhouse 2010). A 
random 50-year baseline climate sequence was drawn from this historical series. Our 
baseline scenario therefore assumes that future weather patterns will retain the 
characteristics of historical climate variability. It should be noted that the purpose of the 
baseline scenario is not to predict future weather patterns, but to provide a counter-
factual for the climate change scenarios. Therefore, taking the baseline scenario, we 
overlay a ten-year moving average of the daily deviations in temperature and 
precipitation predicted by the GCMs. This procedure produces the four ‘synthetic’ 
climate projections mentioned above. This method applies historical climate variability 
(i.e. the historical baseline, which remains constant across all scenarios) and overlays 
future climate changes. With these climate scenarios in hand, we turn to assessing the 
implications of climate change for crop production.   7
2.2  Crop and water balance models 
We use a generic crop model called CLICROP to simulate the impact of the baseline 
and climate change scenarios on rain-fed and irrigated crop yields and on irrigation 
water demand. CLICROP was specifically designed to capture climate change impacts 
since it models water stress from both insufficient and excess water supply (measured 
daily). Yield reduction due to retarded root growth resulting from excess water is known 
as ‘water-logging’. Water-logging reduces yields via oxygen loss and root growth 
hindrance (see Sieben 1964). The inclusion of water-logging and crop-specific 
parameters is an extension over simpler models, such as the FAO’s CROPWAT. 
Moreover, CLICROP’s daily time scale allows it to capture the shorter but higher 
intensity rainfall expected in Eastern Africa (Solomon et al. 2007).  
The effects of the atmosphere (i.e. temperature and precipitation) are modelled 
indirectly in CLCROP via evapotranspiration (Allen et al. 1998) and infiltration to the 
soil layers (based on soil properties). Soil composition is considered at each site and is 
used to calculate soil moisture in each soil layer, including the moisture allowed to 
percolate into deep soil layers. Water balances and the upward flow of soil water are 
then measured. As rain falls on the given soil, certain amounts are allowed to run off, 
infiltrate and percolate through deep layers (in addition to the demands of 
evapotranspiration). Crops are then allowed to draw water from the soil layers. Crop 
yields are estimated using the approach proposed by Allen et al. (1998) with the 
additional possibility that yields are reduced when excess water results in submersion. 
For this examination, the effects of CO2 fertilization are not considered in our analysis. 
As a result, we may overestimate yield losses caused by climate change. Recent free-air 
carbon enrichment (FACE) studies contradict the results of earlier closed laboratory 
experiments that suggested the presence of strong positive productivity effects for major 
crops due to higher CO2 concentration levels (Long et al. 2006). At the same time, the 
validity of FACE results has been questioned (Tubiello et al. 2007); and the debate 
appears to be unresolved at present. 
CLICROP was run at a 1°×1° resolution (i.e. 111 square kilometre grids in a country 
measuring 945,000 square kilometres). Separate models were developed for the nine 
major crops of Tanzania (i.e. root crops, groundnuts, maize, millet, potatoes, sorghum, 
soybeans, sweet potatoes, and wheat). Predicted yields for each sub-national region are 
calculated as the sum of overlaid gridded results weighted by geographic area. 
CLICROP was calibrated to information on soil parameters from the FAO Soils 
Database (e.g. field capacity, wilting point and saturated hydraulic conductivity) (FAO-
UNESCO 2005). Regional information on crop growing seasons and planting dates 
from provided by Sacks et al. (2010). Finally, crop locations were based on You et al. 
(2006) for the year 2000, and crop parameters were drawn from Allen et al. (1998) and 
Doorenbos and Kassam (1979).   
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2.3  Crop modelling results  
Although CLICROP analysis was conducted for nine crops, we focus on the results for 
maize for purposes of exposition. Maize is the principal food crop in Tanzania, 
representing 35 and 45 per cent of calories consumed by poor urban and rural 
households, respectively (Pauw and Thurlow 2010). Tanzanian farmers allocate about 
one-third of their crop land to growing maize, mainly without the use of irrigation (see 
Table A1 in Appendix A). Deviations in dry-land maize yields therefore provide a first-
cut indicator of food availability in Tanzania (Thornton et al. 2009). In addition, the 
implications of climate outcomes for maize are likely to be similar for sorghum and 
millet, making the coverage of caloric sources and land use, particularly for more 
vulnerable populations, even broader. 
Table 2 summarizes the deviations in mean maize yields from a ‘no climate change’ 
baseline scenario for the 10-year period 2041–50. The administrative regions are 
grouped into similar agro-climatic zones based on Fan et al. (2005). There is a high 
degree of variation both across the four climate scenarios considered and across sub-
national regions. For example, maize yields in the northern zone are projected to 
increase substantially in the WET scenario, but decrease by similar amounts in the HOT 
and DRY scenarios. Varied impacts also occur across regions but within the same 
scenario. For example, average maize yields in the WET scenario are projected to 
increase by 15 per cent in Manyara in the northern zone, but decline by 12 per cent in 
Tabora in the central zone. Nevertheless, a few regularities emerge. Maize yields are 
generally more favourable under the COOL and WET scenarios than under the HOT 
and DRY scenarios. In addition, yield declines are much more prevalent across regions 
and scenarios than are yield increases. In particular, under the HOT and DRY scenarios, 
yields rise in only a few regions and these increases are in all instances small. Finally, 
the coastal islands remain virtually unaffected in all climate scenarios.  
Figures 1 and 2 provide insights into the geographic correlation of results. They show 
maize yields for each scenario for 110 districts in Tanzania. The darker lines show the 
boundaries of the larger administrative regions presented in Table 2. Once again, there 
is substantial regional variation in our results. For example, the COOL scenario shows 
significant yield increases in the northern zone (i.e. in the districts surrounding Mount 
Kilimanjaro), while yields decline slightly in the southern coast and southern highlands. 
By contrast, yields are damaged though-out the country in the HOT scenario, with 
particularly strong negative impacts in the northern and Lake Victoria regions. The 
WET and DRY scenarios contrast similarly. The WET scenario shows mean yield 
increasing around Kilimanjaro and its southern slope while they dramatically decrease 
in the western regions around Lake Tanganyika.  
In summary, there are strongly heterogeneous impacts across the four climate scenarios. 
However, as expected, there is some regional correlation in results. Climate outcomes 
favourable (unfavourable) to maize farmers in a particular region are also likely to 
favour (harm) maize farmers in neighbouring regions. At the same time, geographical 
impacts can vary dramatically across scenarios, with some scenarios producing 
favourable outcomes while others resulting in pronounced negative impacts. Obviously, 
from a national food availability perspective, the impacts on yields in the major 
producing regions are more important. Maize is not equally important in all parts of the 
country and for all household groups (e.g. poor/non-poor and farm/non-farm). Since our 
objective is to evaluate the economic implications of climate change for agriculture as a   9
whole and for broadly-defined food security, we employ, in the next section, an 
economy-wide model of Tanzania in order to sort through these impacts. 
3  Economy-wide impacts and food security 
3.1 Economy-wide  model 
The crop modelling results discussed in the previous section are passed down to a 
recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model of mainland 
Tanzania, which estimates the economic impact of the baseline and climate change 
scenarios, including indirect or economy-wide linkages between the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors. Our model belongs to the structural neo-classical class of CGE 
models (see Dervis et al. 1982). DCGE models are well-suited to analysing climate 
change. First, they simulate the functioning of a market economy, including markets for 
labour, capital and commodities, and therefore can evaluate how changing economic 
conditions are mediated via prices and markets. Secondly, DCGE models ensure that all 
economy-wide constraints are respected, which is crucial for long-run climate change 
projections. Finally, CGE models contain detailed sector breakdowns and provide a 
‘simulation laboratory’ for quantitatively examining how the individual impact channels 
of climate change influence the performance and structure of the whole economy (see 
Lofgren et al. 2002 for a detailed exposition of the base modelling framework adapted 
for this analysis). 
Economic decision-making in the DCGE model is the outcome of decentralized 
optimization by producers and consumers within a coherent economy-wide framework. 
A variety of substitution mechanisms occur in response to variations in relative prices, 
including substitution between factors, between imports and domestic goods, and 
between exports and domestic sales. Production and trade function elasticities were 
drawn from Dimaranan (2006). The Tanzania model contains 28 activities or sectors, 
including 12 agricultural subsectors (see Pauw and Thurlow 2010). Six factors of 
production are identified: three types of labour (unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled), 
agricultural land, livestock, and capital. Agricultural activities and land are distributed 
across the 20 administrative regions of mainland Tanzania. This sectoral and regional 
detail captures Tanzania’s economic structure and influences model results. Table A2 in 
Appendix A outlines the disaggregation and regional characteristics of the model. A 
detailed description of the agro-climatic zones of Tanzania can be in the National 
Adaptation Programme of Action for Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania 2007). 
Climate change affects agricultural production, economic growth, and household 
incomes in the DCGE model via predicted annual yield deviations for rain-fed crops 
estimated by CLICROP. The DCGE then determines how much resources should be 
devoted to each crop given their profitability relative to other activities. This 
reallocation of resources permits some autonomous adaptation by farmers and non-
agricultural producers. For example, representative farmers in each region within the 
DCGE model allocate their land and capital between crops based on long-run rates of 
technical change and climate change. However, farmers are unable to anticipate weather 
conditions for a particular season, and so once planted, land cannot be reallocated, even 
if weather patterns are not as expected. The representative producer in our model 
therefore corresponds to a ‘typical farmer’ (see Füssel and Klein 2006), who does not 
assume that historical weather patterns will persist indefinitely, but neither do they have   10
perfect foresight of future climate change. Rather they adapt their behaviour based on 
the gradual realization of climate change. 
The long timeframe over which climate change will unfold implies that dynamic 
processes are important (Arndt et al. 2011a). The recursive dynamic specification of our 
CGE model allows it to capture annual changes in the rate of physical and human 
capital accumulation and technical change. So, for example, if climate change reduces 
agricultural production in a given year, it also reduces income and hence savings. This 
reduction in savings displaces investment and lowers production potential and economic 
growth. Given our long-run focus, our macroeconomic ‘closure’ assumes that changes 
in aggregate absorption are proportionally distributed across nominal private and public 
consumption and investment via distribution neutral changes in savings rates. 
Government savings are flexible, tax rates are fixed, and the real exchange rate adjusts 
to maintain an exogenously determined current account balance. In summary, our 
DCGE model is well-suited to capture path dependent effects within a consistent 
macroeconomic framework. 
3.2 Baseline  scenario   
In order to estimate the economic impact of climate change for Tanzania, we first 
specify a baseline scenario that reflects development trends, policies, and priorities in 
the absence of climate change. The baseline provides a reasonable trajectory for growth 
and structural change of the economy from 2007 to 2050 that can be used as a basis for 
comparison.  
Economic growth in the DCGE model is determined by rates of factor accumulation and 
technical change. For population and labour supply, we assume that Tanzania’s 
population will continue to grow, but at a decelerating rate (i.e. 2.0 per cent today 
falling to 0.3 per cent by 2050). We assume that the expansion of cultivated crop land 
will slow such that growth in agricultural production becomes increasingly dependent 
on the adoption of improved technologies rather than land expansion. As described 
earlier, the crop models use historical climate data to define year-on-year yield 
fluctuations in the baseline for each crop and region. Exogenous long-term agricultural 
productivity growth is set at 0.8 per cent per year in agriculture and 1.2 per cent in non-
agriculture. Improvements in the education levels of Tanzania’s workforce are assumed 
to continue, with supply and productivity rising faster for skilled and semi-skilled 
workers than for unskilled workers (i.e. at 2.0 and 1.5 per cent per year, respectively, 
compared to 0.5 per cent). Under the above assumptions, Tanzania’s economy gradually 
develops, with agriculture’s contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) falling from 
27.8 to 14.1 per cent during 2007–50. Overall, per capita GDP grows at an average 2.2 
per cent per year in the baseline, leading to significant improvements in average 
household welfare. 
3.3  Economy-wide modelling results 
The DCGE model uses the crop yield results from Section 2 to estimate the economy-
wide impacts of climate change. We first discuss the macroeconomic results from the 
model, which are summarized in Table 3. We focus on changes in ‘absorption’, which is 
the broadest measure of national welfare. Absorption tracks an economy’s use of goods 
for household consumption (C), investment (I), and government expenditure (G). 
Absorption is closely related to GDP growth. Formally, absorption (A) is defined as   11
A=C+I+G. Recalling that GDP=C+I+G+X-M, where X is exports and M is imports, we 
can write that A=GDP+M-X. In other words, absorption is the volume of goods 
produced by the economy plus the goods that foreigners supply to the economy 
(imports) less the goods sent out to foreigners (exports). One advantage of measuring 
outcomes based on aggregate absorption is that it is less sensitive to our choice of 
‘closure rules’, which influence the relative sizes of absorption’s C, I, and G 
components. 
Table 3 reports average annual growth rates of real per capita absorption over the entire 
2007–50 simulation period. Changes in annual growth rates are small, with discernable 
reductions for only the HOT and DRY scenarios. However, even small reductions in 
growth rates accumulate over time. For example, by the end of the 2040s, national 
absorption is 0.77 and 1.7 per cent below the baseline in the HOT and DRY scenarios, 
respectively. This is consistent with the larger and more widespread reductions in crop 
yields experienced under these two scenarios (see Table 2).  
We measure the total economic damages caused by climate change via the agricultural 
sector as the cumulative loss or deviation in national absorption from the baseline using 
a five per cent annual discount rate. The largest damages occur in the DRY scenario, 
where the total discounted loss throughout the 2007–50 period amounts to US$13 
billion (measured in 2007 prices). This amount is two-thirds of Tanzania’s GDP in 
2007. By contrast, total discounted absorption rises in the WET scenario by US$3 
billion suggesting possible gains from climate change for Tanzania.1  
Table 3 also decomposes economic damages across time periods. Despite the escalating 
biophysical effects of climate change on agricultural yields towards the end of our 
simulation period, applying a five per cent discount rate means that a significant share 
of the economic costs or benefits of climate change will accrue over the next two 
decades. This is because crop yield reductions are often temporary during a bad year 
and can immediately rebound in the subsequent year if the season’s climate improves. 
In other words, crop yield losses in a given year are usually temporary, unlike damages 
to assets which may have lasting effects, such as roads damaged by flooding. This partly 
explains why agricultural damages are more evenly distributed across time periods. 
However, if we did not discount effects further into the future, then the costs or benefits 
of climate change would be larger and more heavily weighted towards the middle of the 
century. Moreover, it should be noted that most GCMs predict a pronounced 
aggravation of climate change impacts during the second half of the century. Were the 
time horizon of our analysis extended beyond 2050, then later periods would begin to 
exhibit progressively stronger impacts. 
One of the advantages of CGE models is their ability to decompose national impacts to 
the sector and regional levels. Table 4 reports deviations in real GDP from the baseline 
in 2046–50 for different sectors. Since agriculture is our only impact channel through 
which climate effects economic growth, it is not surprising that this sector exhibits the 
largest changes in our four scenarios. However, agriculture provides important inputs 
into downstream sectors, such as agro-processing. For example, agricultural GDP is 
                                                 
1  Other impacts, such as increased frequency and intensity of flooding events, were not modelled for the 
case of Tanzania. The impacts of these events are potentially large (Arndt et al., 2011b) and could 
easily overwhelm the benefits of enhanced moisture to crops.   12
11.5 per cent below the baseline in the DRY scenario by the end of the 2040s. This 
reduces the supply of raw inputs (e.g. grain) to downstream agro-processing sectors 
(e.g. milling), causing their GDP to contract by 7.8 per cent. However, not all sectors 
are adversely affected, even in the DRY scenario. For example, food imports increase in 
order to offset declining domestic production in the DRY scenario (see Table 3). 
Accordingly, some traders in the service sector benefit from higher demand for their 
services. Despite the expansion of services, forestry and fishery, which are only 
indirectly affected by climate change in our analysis, the net effect of climate change is 
a significant reduction in national GDP in the HOT and DRY scenarios and a slight 
decrease/increase in the COOL and WET scenarios, respectively.  
Table 5 presents deviations in real agricultural GDP from the baseline for the different 
regions in the model. It should be noted that the DCGE model is for mainland Tanzania 
only, and so does not reflect changes on the coastal islands (i.e. Pemba and Zanzibar). 
Almost all regions are adversely affected in the HOT and DRY scenarios, with 
particularly large reductions in agricultural GDP in the northern and central zones and 
around Lake Victoria. These regions represent a large share of Tanzania’s agricultural 
sector, and so a drop in their production has national level implications. Similarly, while 
overall agricultural production rises in the WET scenario, it hides significant regional 
variation. While production increases in the northern zone and northern coast, it falls in 
most other regions, including around Lake Victoria. There are also differences in 
regional outcomes even within agro-climatic zones, such as within southern coast. Such 
pronounced regional variation underscores the need for sub-national assessments, 
especially for designing policy responses to climate change.  
Households in the DCGE model are affected by climate change via changes in both 
agricultural incomes and consumer prices. Households can adapt to these changes by 
reallocating their resources (e.g. land, labour and capital) towards less-affected sectors 
or occupations (e.g. non-farm activities). However, if agricultural production falls as a 
result of climate change then consumer prices for agricultural products will likely 
increase. Producers may then allocate more of their resources towards climate change 
affected sectors in order to take advantage of higher prices. This will certainly be the 
case for farmers in regions that are less adversely affected by climate change. 
Households’ adaptation decisions therefore involve production and demand 
considerations, both of which are captured in a general equilibrium model.  
Table 6 reports deviations in households’ real food consumption expenditure from 
baseline by 2046–50. Changes in food consumption in each scenario are less 
pronounced than changes in agricultural GDP. Two factors drive this result. First, 
Tanzania is able to import food to replace falling domestic supplies. For example, the 
11.5 per cent decline in national agricultural production in the DRY scenario (see Table 
4) is partially offset by a 37.1 per cent increase in net food imports (see Table 3), 
leaving national food consumption to fall by 8.0 per cent (see Table 6). Second, the 
model assumes that transport systems are sufficiently developed in Tanzania by 2050 
that food is effectively traded in national markets. This means that falling production 
and excess demand in certain regions can be supplied by producers in other regions. In 
this way, market forces will distribute changes in national food consumption across 
regions and household groups.  
The impact of climate change on incomes and food security therefore depends on three 
household characteristics. First, climate change has region-specific implications, with   13
some regions benefitting from improved conditions while others are adversely affected. 
Second, climate change will affect crops differently, and so changes in households’ 
agricultural incomes will depend on their cropping patterns and their ability to reallocate 
farm resources between farm activities. Finally, agriculture generates only part of 
households’ incomes and food comprises only part of their consumption basket. Climate 
change will therefore affect households differently based on their income and 
consumption patterns.  
In sum, despite endogenous market-based adaptation, there are still significant 
differences in outcomes across household groups and regions. For example, lower-
income households experience larger declines in per capita food consumption than 
higher-income households in the COOL and DRY scenarios. This is because poorer 
households are typically more reliant on agriculture for their livelihoods, and because 
they spend a larger share of their incomes on food. Likewise, while all regions around 
Lake Victoria experience similar reductions in agricultural GDP (see Table 5), 
household food consumption declines by 10.5 per cent in Kagera and by only 6.7 per 
cent in Shinyanga. This is because households in the Shinyanga region are less 
dependent on agricultural incomes, and are more heavily engaged in non-farm activities 
than are households in Kagera. Finally, food consumption amongst non-farm 
households also declines in the DRY scenario, due to rising food prices and falling real 
incomes (i.e. due to falling demand for non-agricultural products). 
4 Conclusions 
Relative to a no climate change baseline and considering domestic agricultural 
production as the principal channel of impact, food security in Tanzania appears likely 
to deteriorate as a consequence of climate change. This relative decline comes about 
through reductions in agricultural production, principally food production, due to 
increases in temperature and changes in rainfall patterns. In the DRY scenario, 
agricultural production levels are more than 10 per cent below the levels of a 
hypothetical no climate change scenario by mid-century. This reduced productive 
capacity also limits growth in exports and growth in household incomes hence reducing 
the overall capacity of the economy to obtain and distribute food from international 
markets. It is important to point out that the results do not point to an absolute decline in 
the levels of food security indicators, such as total agricultural production and 
household purchasing power. Rather, the rate of improvement in these indicators in 
three out of four scenarios is reduced. In addition, in one scenario, projected changes in 
climate are favourable to agricultural production and food security. Overall, the analysis 
points to a high degree of diversity of outcomes across climate scenarios, sectors, and 
regions. The economic modelling indicates that markets have the potential to smooth 
outcomes on households across regions and income groups, though noteworthy 
differences in impacts across households persist both by region and by income category.  
The methodology applied is well-suited to considering the implications of climate 
change for growth, development, and ultimately food security. However, while the 
economic modelling framework is comprehensive, the treatment of climate change 
within the modelling framework is not. Climate change could impact food security 
through numerous additional channels beyond reductions in potential yields. These 
additional channels merit particular attention in future research. We will briefly discuss 
three. First, the increase in intensity of rainfall due to climate change has the potential to   14
increase the frequency and intensity of flooding events (Arndt et al. 2011b). As recent 
events in Pakistan illustrate, flooding can be highly destructive. Not only does flooding 
cause a spike in food insecurity in the short-run, it frequently wipes out economic 
infrastructure, such as transport networks, with potentially long-term implications for 
production and growth (Chinowsky 2011). Second, the results presented reiterate the 
importance of long-run accumulation (Arndt et al. 2011a). If rates of growth decline 
even slightly over long periods of time, this decline eventually leads to significant 
economic impacts. In this context, it is important to recall that the (assumed) underlying 
rate of agricultural productivity growth is the same across all climate scenarios. It is 
certainly conceivable that climate change could reduce the expected rate of underlying 
agricultural productivity growth for any given level of effort devoted to new technology 
generation and adoption. Finally, all world prices are assumed to be constant. If the 
climate outcomes in the DRY scenario also resulted in reduced (increased) production 
globally, then the impacts of the reduction in agricultural production would be 
magnified (mitigated) by increased (decreased) prices for food commodities on world 
markets.  
Overall, while significant progress has been registered, we remain at nascent stages in 
understanding the implications of climate change, across the multiplicity of possible 
dimensions, for food security in vulnerable low income countries such as Tanzania.15 
 
Appendix A 
Table A1: Disaggregation of the Tanzania DCGE model 
Agricultural sectors  Maize, Sorghum, Millet, Rice, wheat & barley, Cassava, Root crops, Pulses, 
Oilseeds, Horticulture, Export crops, Livestock, Other agriculture. 
Non-agricultural 
sectors 
Mining, Meat processing, Maize milling, Rice milling, Other milling, Other 
food processing, Export crop processing, Chemicals, Machinery, Other 
manufacturing, Electricity, Water distribution, Construction, Trade and 
transport, Other private services, Public services. 
Sub-national regions 
(for agricultural sectors 
only) 
Arusha, Coast, Dodoma, Dar es Salaam, Iringa, Kagera, Kigoma, 
Kilimanjaro, Lindi, Mara, Mbeya, Morogoro, Mtwara, Mwanza, Manyara, 
Rukwa, Ruvuma, Shinyanga, Singida, Tabora, Tanga. 
Factors  Primary school and uneducated labour, Secondary school educated labour, 
Tertiary educated labour, Agricultural capital, Mining capital, Non-agricultural 
capital, Agricultural crop land (by region), Livestock capital (by region). 
Households  Farm households (by region and national per capita consumption 
expenditure quintile), Rural non-farm households (by national per capita 
consumption expenditure quintile), Urban non-farm households (by national 









Non-farm households  Farm households 
 















Population  (1000)  31,683  5,890 3,590 2,301 25,793  2,517 3,963 3,657 1,690 7,889 1,972  4,105 
Number of households  6,393  1,360  878  482 5,033  480 938 698 431 1,273  355  859 
Household  size  5.0 4.3 4.1 4.8 5.1 5.2 4.2 5.2 3.9 6.2 5.6  4.8 
Per  capita  exp.  (US$)  329 558 687 356 277 339 288 372 355 214 324  209 
Poverty  rate  (%)  40.0 24.9 15.8 39.2 43.5 40.9 33.5 38.4 37.6 49.0 54.1  45.8 
Poor population (1000)  12,679  1,468  567  901  11,211  1,030 1,328 1,405 635  3,868 1,066  1,879 
Share of poor (%)  100.0  11.6  4.5  7.1  88.4 8.1  10.5 11.1 5.0  30.5 8.4  14.8 
Harvest  area  (1,000  ha)  -  -  -  -  8,209 1,004 951  1,919 605  2,597 411  722 
Average farm land (ha)  -  -  -  -  1.63  2.09 1.01 2.75 1.40 2.04 1.16  0.84 
  Maize  -  -  -  -  0.53  0.74  0.41 1.04 0.27 0.52 0.44  0.34 
  Sorghum and millet  -  -  -  -  0.18  0.11 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.31 0.05  0.34 
  Other cereals  -  -  -  -  0.12  0.17 0.05 0.43 0.00 0.15 0.02  0.00 
    Roots  - - - - 0.24  0.04  0.15 0.22 0.82 0.38 0.10  0.01 
  Pulses and oilseeds  -  -  -  -  0.29  0.47 0.14 0.57 0.16 0.31 0.43  0.14 
    Horticulture  - - - - 0.13  0.35 0.12 0.22 0.03 0.14 0.07  0.00 
  Export crops  -  -  -  -  0.13  0.21 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.03  0.01 
Notes:    Population data is from HBS 2000–01 (National Bureau of Statistics 2002). Per capita expenditure is based on consumption spending from the 2007 social   
accounting matrix. The poverty line identifies the bottom two per capita expenditure quintiles as poor. 
Source:   Authors’ calculations using data from Pauw and Thurlow (2010).17 
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HOT ncar_ccsm3_0  a1b  1.87  5.67  +0.0565 
COOL ncar_pcm1 a1b  1.13  5.37  +0.0157 
WET csiro_mk3_0  a2  1.43  13.3  +0.0243 
DRY ukmo_hadgem
1 
a1b 1.49  -11.14  -0.0853 
Source:  Own calculations using GCM results. 
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Table 2: Changes in mean annual dry-land maize yields, 2041–50 
  Change from baseline (%)
 HOT  COOL WET DRY
Northern zone   
   Arusha  -15.05 4.06 12.66 -23.1
   Kilimanjaro  -13.61 1.87 11.81 -15.55
   Manyara  -13.46 3.18 15.28 -16.64
   Tanga  -11.29 1.31 8.12 -6.84
Southern highlands   
   Iringa  -3.2  -2.72 1.51 -5.51
   Mbeya  0.25  -3.02 -3.12 -4.58
   Ruvuma  -2.23 3.74 5.51 -5.17
Northern coast   
   Dar es Salaam  -1.37 -0.42 0.97 -0.03
   Morogoro  -4.49 -3.11 4.15 -5.49
   Pwani  -6.25 -1.83 3.64 -5.09
Southern coast   
   Lindi  -3.03 -2.97 -2.45 -4.29
   Mtwara  0.01  -4.65 -7.47 0.19
Lake Victoria   
   Kagera  -4.64 -3.35 -9.35 -16.48
   Mara  -6.94 -1.19 -0.33 -16.91
   Mwanza  -6.18 1.11 -2.62 -18.27
   Shinyanga  -8.14 3.52 -2.76 -19.78
Western zone   
   Kigoma  2.03  -7.56 -7.73 -14.27
   Rukwa  0.69  -4.57 -8.39 -8.63
Central zone   
   Dodoma  -9.45 1.15 13.46 -13.25
   Singida  -6.79 0.74 -0.89 -9.8
   Tabora  -4.64 -0.91 -12.38 -14.74
  Coastal islands   
   Kaskazini Pemba  -0.9  -0.52 2.58 -2.39
   Kaskazini Unguja  -1.37 -0.42 0.97 -0.03
   Kusini Unguja  -1.37 -0.42 0.97 -0.03
   Mjini Magharibi  -1.37 -0.42 0.97 -0.03
Source:  Results from CLICROP models for Tanzania. 
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Table 3: Macroeconomic results 
 Baseline  HOT  COOL  WET  DRY 
Average annual real per capita absorption 
growth rate, 2007–50 (%)  2.74  2.72  2.73  2.74  2.70 
   Deviation from baseline  -  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.04 
Average annual undiscounted value of 
absorption, 2046-50 (US$ billions, 2007 
prices)  95.42  94.69 95.27 95.51 93.82 
   Deviation from baseline  -  -0.73  -0.16  0.08  -1.60 
   Deviation as a share of baseline (%)  -  -0.77  -0.16  0.09  -1.71 
Accumulated discounted deviation in 
absorption from baseline, 2007-50 (US$ 
billions,  2007  prices)  -  -4.21 -0.91 3.03  -12.70 
   Accrued during 2010s  -  -1.10  -0.45  0.53  -3.38 
   Accrued during 2020s  -  -0.94  0.11  0.81  -3.61 
   Accrued during 2030s  -  -0.74  -0.18  0.73  -2.67 
   Accrued during 2040s  -  -1.00  -0.23  0.26  -2.46 
Deviation in average annual net food imports 
from baseline, 2046–50 (%)    21.34  3.65  -6.49  37.13 
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Deviation in average annual real GDP from 
baseline, 2046–50 (%) 
 (%)  HOT  COOL  WET  DRY 
Total GDP  100.00  -0.89  -0.19  0.17  -1.93 
   Agriculture  27.82  -5.42  -1.19  1.10  -11.51 
     Cereals  8.31  -6.05  -0.59  1.25  -10.48 
     Maize  4.42  -5.91  -0.45  1.23  -10.89 
     Root crops  3.27  -2.44  -1.54  -1.40  -10.13 
     Pulses and oilseeds  2.71  -2.80  -0.99  0.03  -8.75 
     Horticulture  5.19  -5.44  -3.22  3.45  -13.92 
     Export crops  2.79  -6.53  -1.03  1.79  -11.37 
     Livestock  5.55  -6.96  -0.06  0.04  -13.18 
   Forestry and fisheries  4.02  0.20  0.03  0.03  0.50 
   Mining  3.94  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
   Manufacturing  8.84  -2.05  -0.38  0.26  -4.42 
     Food processing  4.58  -3.57  -0.62  0.32  -7.84 
   Construction and    
energy 
10.33 -0.02  0.00  0.02  -0.01 
   Services  45.05  0.13  0.03  -0.03  0.23 
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Deviation in average annual real GDP from 
baseline, 2046–50 (%) 
 (%)  HOT  COOL  WET  DRY 
National (all regions)  100.00  -5.42  -1.19  1.10  -11.51 
Northern zone  21.85  -9.76  -1.89  8.51  -15.51 
   Arusha and Manyara  10.12  -13.18  -0.69  7.07  -18.89 
   Kilimanjaro  5.95  -7.88  -4.16  9.49  -15.23 
   Tanga  5.77  -5.58  -1.66  10.06  -9.75 
Southern  highlands  15.72  -2.14 -1.88 -0.84 -6.33 
   Iringa  3.36  -3.35  -2.04  1.49  -6.45 
   Mbeya  7.53  -0.44  -2.64  -3.08  -6.46 
   Ruvuma  4.83  -4.15  -0.46  1.27  -6.02 
Northern coast  13.48  -3.59  -1.32  5.66  -9.23 
   Dar es Salaam  0.62  2.20  1.89  5.79  -5.71 
   Morogoro  8.85  -4.11  -1.85  4.98  -9.37 
   Pwani  4.00  -3.34  -0.62  7.18  -9.47 
Southern  coast  3.95 -1.88  0.65 0.10 -6.49 
   Lindi  1.94  -4.56  -0.11  3.41  -12.48 
      Mtwara  2.00 1.38 1.57 -3.92  0.77 
Lake  Victoria  30.21  -6.24 -0.12 -3.53 -13.61 
   Kagera  7.60  -4.67  -0.58  -7.90  -13.78 
   Mara  4.95  -5.18  -0.94  -1.16  -12.14 
   Mwanza  8.99  -6.84  -0.65  -3.14  -13.28 
   Shinyanga  8.66  -7.66  1.29  -1.41  -14.66 
Western  zone  6.96  -0.57 -4.04 -5.32 -9.47 
   Kigoma  4.64  -0.36  -4.18  -4.92  -10.50 
   Rukwa  2.32  -1.00  -3.78  -6.08  -7.48 
Central zone  7.83  -5.39  -0.11  0.05  -10.19 
   Dodoma  3.07  -6.43  0.80  8.20  -10.05 
   Singida  2.09  -4.95  0.25  -0.91  -7.36 
   Tabora  2.68  -4.54  -1.46  -8.66  -12.60 
Source:  Results from the DCGE model for Tanzania. 
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Table 6: Household food consumption results 
 Initial  food 
consumption 
Deviation in average annual real per capita food 
consumption from baseline, 2046–50 (%) 
 (US$  p.c.)  HOT  COOL  WET  DRY 
National (all 
households) 
355 -3.57  -0.78  0.33  -7.95 
   Farm  303  -3.59  -0.83  0.35  -8.04 
   Non-farm  582  -3.53  -0.65  0.30  -7.75 
   Quintile 1  114  -3.72  -1.06  0.39  -8.54 
   Quintile 2  193  -3.58  -0.92  0.35  -8.11 
   Quintile 3  272  -3.62  -0.83  0.36  -8.15 
   Quintile 4  390  -3.55  -0.81  0.35  -7.96 
   Quintile 5  805  -3.54  -0.67  0.31  -7.75 
Northern zone  425  -3.69  -0.90  0.17  -8.42 
   Arusha and 
Manyara 
430 -3.86  -0.91  0.23  -8.53 
   Kilimanjaro  477  -4.04  -0.98  0.40  -9.16 
   Tanga  382  -3.17  -0.83  -0.12  -7.64 
Southern highlands  268  -3.64  -0.65  0.33  -7.79 
   Iringa  260  -3.81  -0.63  0.23  -8.14 
   Mbeya  214  -3.62  -0.64  0.70  -7.49 
   Ruvuma  377  -3.53  -0.68  0.01  -7.82 
Northern coast  459  -3.18  -0.80  0.28  -7.14 
   Dar es Salaam  789  -3.10  -0.89  0.36  -7.33 
   Morogoro  324  -3.45  -0.77  0.35  -7.42 
   Pwani  649  -2.91  -0.80  0.17  -6.74 
Southern coast  412  -3.53  -0.91  0.34  -8.18 
   Lindi  452  -3.34  -0.94  0.40  -7.93 
   Mtwara  379  -3.71  -0.88  0.28  -8.43 
Lake Victoria  236  -3.60  -0.96  0.54  -8.17 
   Kagera  226  -4.36  -1.62  1.14  -10.51 
   Mara  399  -3.53  -0.78  -0.09  -8.40 
   Mwanza  218  -3.32  -0.64  0.41  -7.18 
   Shinyanga  200  -3.21  -0.76  0.55  -6.72 
Western zone  285  -3.98  -0.64  0.25  -8.64 
   Kigoma  277  -3.79  -0.76  0.19  -8.51 
   Rukwa  294  -4.19  -0.51  0.31  -8.79 
Central zone  228  -3.59  -0.78  0.45  -7.86 26 
 
   Dodoma  204  -3.16  -0.94  0.08  -7.37 
   Singida  267  -3.78  -0.75  0.62  -8.08 
   Tabora  228  -3.85  -0.65  0.69  -8.18 
Source:  Results from the DCGE model for Tanzania. 
 

































































































or WET and D DRY scenari ios, 2041–50
 
 
0 